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Abstract
The current claims for asylum and refugee protection of Roma from the so-called “Western Balkan states” are rejected
by the German state. Based on this practice, Romani migrants are not recognized as genuine refugees but classified as
irregular migrants and thus labeled as “bogus” asylum seekers. This article discusses the discursive process through which
the legal status of Romani migrants is irregularized within the German migration regime. Furthermore, through an em-
pirical study, the article shows how Romani organizations and migrants are struggling for a collective right to remain in
Germany. In their political-legal struggles for recognition, Roma reinterpret not only their legal status as irregular migrants,
but also their legal-cultural practices: by appropriating the semantics of human rights through the lenses of their cultural
backgrounds. This, in turn, shifts the analytical focus to the productivity of human rights discourses. They are assumed
to be an effective tool to enforce legal claims against the German migration regime. In this context, the article examines
legal-cultural practices, which become visible in the struggle, by exploring six justification narratives—through these, the
Roma’s political-legal belonging to the German nation-state shall be legitimized.
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1. Introduction
While the number of Roma1 from the so-called Western
Balkans2 whomigrated to Germany has sunken since the
end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
as well as the Kosovo War, figures have been continu-
ally rising since 2008, with 2015 presenting the peak of
the development for the time being (Alscher, Obergfell,
& Roos, 2015; Heuser, 2014; Wenke, Jadžić, & Jeremić,
2016). The reasons for the current migration vary de-
pending on political context and individual fate; beyond
all differences, Roma’smotivations formigrating rest par-
ticularly on the fact that they became the “losers” af-
ter the collapse of Yugoslavia, which manifests in every-
day practice in the form of diverse human rights viola-
tions (Sardelić, 2014). Since 2009, however, a process
of visa liberalization, which has made it easier for West-
ern Balkan citizens to obtain valid emigration paperwork,
has been reinforcing the current migration (Cherkezova,
2014, p. 5).
1 In the European context, Roma is both an ethnic self-representation and depicts a politically enforced umbrella term for diverse, heterogeneous sub-
groups. In the latter case, this term includes—next to Roma— the Sinti, Kale, Manush, and related groups—although it cannot always be assumed
that individual members of the respective groups approve of this political convention of speech (Knecht & Toivanen, 2006). The term “Roma” is used
particularly as an umbrella term in the first part of the article because it appears as such in the sources used; however, I employ this in my own empirical
analysis as a self-description for people from theWestern Balkans and those who label themselves as such, for instance, in public or before authorities,
and, in this context, differentiate themselves from other subgroups. According to Hancock (2002, p. xix), I use the term “Romani” as an adjective. I only
use the often pejoratively found and politically discredited term “gypsy” (Knecht & Toivanen, 2006) when it appears as such in the sources used.
2 The so-called “Western Balkans” is a relatively new political umbrella term that, next to the successor states of former Yugoslavia (excluding Slovenia),
also includes Albania.
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This development is embedded in the EU integration
process of Western Balkan states which prioritizes the
protection of minorities. This, in turn, accompanies the
fact that it is in the interest of the respective govern-
ments not only to accept Roma deported from Germany
as well as from other European member states, but also
to prevent the migration of potential asylum seekers so
that they do not lose credibility as possible EU Member
State candidates (Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2012). At the same
time, a desired “side effect” of the Europeanization of
the Western Balkan countries was to tame and control
the migration of Roma, by which the “Roma question”
became an aspect of securitization within the German
and European migration regime (Kacarska, 2012; van
Baar, 2011b). Nevertheless, for many Roma, applying for
asylum or refugee protection after arriving in Germany
presents a chance to escape diverse forms of discrimina-
tion. The German government does not view Roma’s pro-
tection claims as being worthy of recognition, as they are
usually neither politically persecuted nor fleeing from
war and thus fail to meet the criteria for German asy-
lum and refugee protection. Instead, German authorities
are irregularizing the Romani migrant status and classify-
ing them as “economic” or “poverty” migrants (Sardelić,
2016; Scherr, 2015a).3
Against this background, a clearly visible Romani
protest movement, which fights for a collective right of
residence that employs human rights in order to dis-
rupt Roma’s history of infringement, at least in regard
to refugee law, began forming around 2008. The shared
fundamental attitude is that a structural discrimination
against Roma dominates in theWestern Balkans and that
the present asylum and refugee protection should be ex-
tended to include them.4
This article has two main goals: Firstly, it aims to de-
pict Roma’s current migration from the Western Balkans
within European policy at present, and subsequently re-
veal through which practices they are categorized as “bo-
gus asylum seekers” in legal and political discourse as well
as in themedia (Kacarska, 2012; Lee, 2014; Sardelić, 2016).
By using selected examples, I sketch which role Western
Balkan governments playwithin the German aswell as Eu-
ropean migration regime.5 Secondly, based on my own
empirical study, the article attempts to illustrate legal-
cultural practices, which become visible in the struggle for
recognition, by illustrating six justification narratives.6
In the following, I first detail the article’s theoreti-
cal framework (2.) and continue by elaborating on my
methodological approach (3.). The analysis then begins
with an outline of the current human rights situation of
Roma from theWestern Balkans (4.). Building on this and
within the context of the European Union, a closer look
is taken at the Germanmigration regime, which, by utiliz-
ing various border practices, tries to categorize and con-
trol the migration movement as well as include it in its
political economy (5.). Subsequently, I offer the general
results of my field research by presenting an in-depth
overview of the central justification narratives used to
enforce the right to political-legal belonging (6.). Lastly,
by way of an example, namely the occupation of the Sinti
and RomaMemorial in Berlin, I illustrate how the transla-
tion and appropriation of human rights can tangibly take
place as well as how selected justification narratives are
staged and which social effects can result therefrom (7.).
2. Theoretical Orientations: Migration Regimes,
Translation of Human Rights, and Law as Culture
The present article is based on a theoretical perspec-
tive that relates migration regimes, translation theory,
and law-as-culture analytics. The concept “regime” has
proven to be extremely fruitful when trying to ade-
quately understand discursive practices of legal inclusion
and exclusion as well as forms of border control and legal
categorization of migrants. Karakayali and Tsianos (2007,
p. 14) consider a regime:
An ensemble of social practices and structures
—discourses, subjects, state practices—the arrange-
ment of which is not determined from the outset,
but rather consists precisely in [generating] answers
to questions and problems [stemming from] the dy-
namic elements and processes…” (own translation)
Based on this definition, a migration regime can be
considered institutionalized practices and structures in
which principles, norms, and legal conceptions concern-
ing how to addressmigration are defined and “the actors
installing it accept as an objective set of rules for a certain
period” (Hess & Karakayali, 2007, p. 48, own translation).
Accordingly, the categorization of migrants can be
understood as a contingent process, whereby determin-
ing the difference between “legalized” and “irregular-
ized” migrant status is carried out through social strug-
gles. However, according to the regime perspective, it is
not a state’s legislative, judicial, and executive branches
3 From a sociological/anthropological perspective it is not possible to determine who is a poverty migrant and who is a refugee. As this differentiation
occurs in political and legal negotiation processes, the analytical task is rather to show how this differentiation takes place in political-legal practice and
which alternative definitions exist. Cf. Scherr (2015a).
4 Comments on the protestmovement are based onmy own field studies that I conductedwhile completingmy doctoral thesis. Formore on the empirical
approach, see Chapter 3 (Methodological Framework).
5 In this article, I present on the one hand a general overview of the human rights situation of Roma in the Western Balkans; concrete examples, on the
other hand, focus especially on Serbia and Macedonia as well as occasionally on Kosovo.
6 Several works on this thematic field do admittedly exist, however, not in the presented synopsis and German context. For instance, in their insightful
works, Sardelić (2016) and Çağlar and Mehling (2013) also address the question of how Romani migrants try to achieve political belonging via acts of
citizenship. In contrast to their particularly normative perspective, this article does not explore the citizenship debate in such detail, but instead more
deeply reveals the culturalmodus operandi of appropriation and translation of universal norms (human rights). On general debates about struggles for
recognition and human rights in relationship to Roma, see Tremlett, McGarry and Agarin (2014) and Sigona and Trehan (2009).
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alone that are involved in the struggles, but also a mul-
titude of actors operating at various levels that interact
with each other: from supranational institutions (such as
the EU, UNHCR) to NGOs and the media to civil society
and migrants themselves (Müller, 2010, p. 26).
Following Benhabib (2004), I assume that the con-
flict surrounding the recognition of rights for migrants
ignites at the central contradiction within democratic
states: namely that between national self-determination
and the preservation of human rights. By making strate-
gic use of human rights and attempting to exert norma-
tive pressure on state institutions in the process, Roma
and their representatives also subjectify human rights se-
mantics with the aim of renegotiating the relationship
between national interests and universal human rights,
thus posing the question of legal affiliation anew.
The productivity of human rights therefore moves
into the focus of analysis, whereby the Geneva Conven-
tion on Refugees and asylum law are to be understood
as a segment of the international human rights regime
(Benhabib, 2004, p. 7ff). However, their potential only
unfolds when they are translated into concrete prac-
tice complexes and appropriated there. Following Renn
(2010), I assume that this appropriation is not a seam-
less process of translation, but rather one riddled with
numerous shifts in meaning, as human rights must pass
through different application filters. A translation is suc-
cessful when a normative linkage of meaning is formed
between two ormore sub-contexts. Roma, togetherwith
refugee organizations, initiatives, networks, and experts,
play a crucial role in coordinating the struggles over the
right of residence, for they form, to put it in a simplified
manner, the interfaces between political-legal decision
makers and the affected persons. Through their accumu-
lated knowledge and material resources, they have the
potential to successfully translate human rights claims
into the political-legal field (Göhlich, Nekula, & Renn,
2014, p. 9ff).
In order to present the modus operandi in which
Roma appropriate certain human rights semantics in
light of their cultural knowledge and respectively inter-
twine legal codes with cultural presuppositions, I refer
to Gephart’s (2015) “law-as-culture analytics”. With the
help of his analytics, it is first possible to disengage the le-
gal concept of a strictly codified understanding and open
it up to a multidimensional perspective in order to cap-
ture (general) notions of norms not fixed by the state. In
the context of this article, the protest movement as well
as Roma involved in it not only claim human rights as
codified in asylum and refugee law, but likewise produce
new rights in the course of cultural appropriation and
reinterpretation of human rights codes and then retrans-
late them into the political-legal field (Stammers, 2009).
Beyond conventional legal analysis, an adequate inves-
tigation of legal-cultural practices, moreover, requires a
concept of law in which the focus is not only on the
purely (juridical-) normative aspects. By including sym-
bolic (Gephart, 2015) and narrative (Suntrup, 2013) di-
mensions in addition to a normative dimension in the
analysis of the struggle for recognition, I would not only
like to demonstrate hownormative claims of validity (Gel-
tungsansprüche) are derived by seizing (historical) sym-
bols and justification narratives, but also how the repre-
sentation of cultural knowledge is intertwined with uni-
versal codes of human rights.
3. Methodological Framework
As the analysis of discourses, collective knowledge, and
practices takes a central position in this article, the “soci-
ology of knowledge approach to discourse” (Keller, 2011)
appears appropriate for reviewing the issue adequately.
While in the first step of the analysis—which reflects
upon the German migration regime—attention is given
to linking general reflections (on discourses, knowledge,
and practices) to findings gained primarily through an
analysis of legal documents and statements, the second
section—which addresses the struggle for recognition of
Roma as well as justification narratives—offers research
results that I obtained from observations and interviews,
in particular.
Against this backdrop, I analyzed the practices of the
protest movement as well as those of the German mi-
gration regime within the scope of multi-sited research
(Marcus, 1995) carried out in multiple phases between
2012 and 2016 in numerous larger German cities. The
sites were specially determined by participating in di-
verse demonstrations, political information and cultural
events, as well as bymaintaining (close) contact to Roma.
In addition, I conducted interviews, including ones with
Romanimigrants, Romani representatives, (high ranking)
politicians as well as various lawyers and NGO activists.
4. On the Contemporary Human Rights Situation of
Roma from the Western Balkans
The primary reasons for the difficult human rights situa-
tion of Roma from the Western Balkans (but also from
the Balkans in general) are not only due to a political
shift to the right that began setting in with the collapse
of communism/socialism. Such an explanation falls short:
in order to grasp the dimension of the transformation
process in the Western Balkans, one needs to take ne-
oliberal developments into consideration. The promise
of neoliberalism (e.g., prosperity for all) never materi-
alized with the introduction of post-socialist states in
the Balkans. Rather, it accelerated the division of these
societies. With the onset of neoliberalism in the post-
socialist Western Balkans, vehemently supported by the
EU through its enlargement process, a new underpriv-
ileged class and a new form of poverty emerged. Not
only are Roma affected, but they are situated on the low-
est social rung, struggle the most with the already diffi-
cult living conditions, and are used as scapegoats for the
adverse social and economic situation (Mappes-Niediek,
2012; van Baar, 2011a).
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While Roma de jure have the same rights as all other
citizens of the respective states, they are de facto per-
manently denied these rights (Sardelić, 2015). According
to Balibar (2003; 2009), the discrepancy betweenminori-
ties’ codified rights and rights in social practice cannot
be resolved, as the current concepts of citizenship (par-
ticularly in the Balkans) are dominated by nationalism: a
state for Roma that Balibar terms “European apartheid”.
Roma, who can at best be said to have semi-citizenship
(Sardelić, 2016), are consequently exposed to a vicious
cycle of structural discrimination whose individual com-
ponents can scarcely be isolated: racism, high unemploy-
ment, ghettoization, poor institutionalized educational
capital, almost nonexistent social mobility, lack of trust
in (state) institutions, retreat towards kinship networks,
etc. (Mappes-Niediek, 2012).7
Migration into foreign European countries then ap-
pears as a possibility to escape structural discrimination
and claim fundamental human rights. How this migra-
tion occurs in each individual case, however, depends
not only on the respective level of economic and social
capital, but is also directly related to refugee policy and
migration control in the EU, namely those of the respec-
tive destination states.
5. Romani Migration and the German Migration
Regime Within the European Context
In the process of the Europeanization of migration con-
trol, the European Union has developed its own migra-
tion regime that has led to new and differentiated forms
of securitization. The harmonization of migration policy
and migration law within the EU has also brought about
the consequence that not only external European bor-
ders, but also neighboring countries (as transit countries
and the migrants’ countries of origins) have become sub-
ject to migration control and have since been requested
to assist the EU in selecting and regulating migrants
(Banse, Müller, & Stobbe, 2007; Betts, 2010). In this pro-
cess, the EU established a cordon sanitaire around its ter-
ritorial borders starting in the 1990s, through which it
includes states into its political economy as needed and
grants these states’ citizens certainmobility rights (Andri-
jašević et al., 2005; Hess, 2012).
In reaction to the increasing numbers of migrants
from the Western Balkans, the German government, as
a constitutive and constituent part of the EU, began
successively institutionalizing diverse legal measures in
order to regulate the migration movement and carry
out deportations more efficiently in 2009 (Heuser, 2014;
Paech, 2016). However, since the arrival of large num-
bers of refugees in Germany in 2015,8 the German gov-
ernment reacted with the extreme tightening of asy-
lum and refugee law in multiple steps (Wenke et al.,
2016), which, in addition to the “asylum comprise” in
1993 (Cremer, 2013), can be considered the largest en-
croachment on refugee protection in German post-war
history.9 In order to relieve authorities and courts of asy-
lum procedures in terms of time and money, the Ger-
man government, as part of Asylum Package 2, classified
Kosovo, Montenegro, and Albania as “safe countries of
origin”10 and thus declared them as “free from perse-
cution” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015a;Wissenschaftliche
Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, 2016).
Within this context, the Federal Office for Migration
and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge)
codes the migration of Roma as economically motivated,
and thus they do not qualify for asylum or refugee pro-
tection. With this classification, the legislation creates a
blanket presumptive rule of non-persecution, resulting in
asylum seekers being required to present evenmore con-
vincing and coherent persecution stories in order to be
recognized as legitimate refugees. Unless those seeking
protection do not assert facts satisfying the conclusion
that they have been persecuted against this presumptive
rule, they will receive a negative decision (Paech, 2016,
p. 13ff).
The increasing number of Romawhomigrated to Ger-
many or other European member states beginning in
2009 can be explained in the context of visa exemption
for citizens of theWestern Balkans, whereby this is again
closely related to a process that Kacarska (2012) labels
as “Europeanisation through mobility”. Whereas (most)
Western Balkan states have already received visa liber-
alization (within the Schengen Area) in the long-term,11
they still only have the prospect of EU membership,12
also conditional on their protection of minorities. Nev-
ertheless, the EU encourages the respective states to ne-
glect human rights standards in order tomore effectively
reduce the number of asylum seekers (Flüchtlingsrat
NRW, 2012).
In this context and using the example of negotia-
tions between the German, Serbian, and Macedonian
governments, lawyer Nizaqete Bislimi (2014) demon-
strates how, in the process of visa liberalization, they had
to perform numerous administrative reforms in return
7 For a detailed overview, see European Roma Rights Centre (2016).
8 According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2016), approximately 890,000 people seeking protection were regis-
tered in 2015, notably refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
9 The Asylum Packages 1 and 2, passed by the Bundestag in 2015, constitute the spearhead of this development. In addition to declaring “safe countries
of origins” and expediting the asylum process, the laws are accompanied particularly by restrictive work bans, unannounced deportations, deportations
of those with serious illness, benefit cuts, tightening of family reunification processes, as well as an increase of integration courses, see Pro Asyl (2015a,
2015b).
10 The German government already classified Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia as safe in 2014. Cf. Deutscher Bundestag (2014).
11 Citizens of Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina received visa exemption between 2008 and 2010, which enabled
them to move within the Schengen Area for a limited time (Kacarska, 2012). Such visa exemptions have yet to be granted for citizens of Kosovo. Cf. Eu-
ropean Parliament (2017).
12 Not including Croatia, as it already became an EU member state in 2013.
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—including drafting bilateral readmission agreements
that came into effect in 2002 and facilitating deporta-
tions of war refugees obligated to leave.13 With visa
exemption in 2009 and the accompanying increase of
asylum applications by Roma in Germany and other
EU member states, the former German Federal Minis-
ter of the Interior, Hans-Peter Friedrich, as well as the
EU Commission threatened the Serbian and Macedo-
nian governments with reinstating visa requirements as
long as the rising number of asylum applications did
not stop. In the course of this, Friedrich approached the
press and defamedmigrants from Serbia andMacedonia
as poverty migrants—targeting especially Roma even if
only through implicit semantic references (Heuser, 2014,
p. 71; see also Flüchtlingsrat NRW, 2012; Lee, 2014).
To divert attention from the social issue of the critical
human rights situation, for instance, in Serbia in 2012,
not only the media, but also the then Minister of Inter-
nal Affairs, Ivica Dačić, labeled Romani refugees as “false
asylum seekers”, migrating to Germany in order to leech
off the German welfare state. In order to prevent Roma,
who are not legally permitted to do so, from departing
to Germany,14 border practices have emerged that rep-
resent “ethnic profiling”, which is a violation of the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights (Flüchtlingsrat NRW,
2012).15 Due to the overall precarious human rights sit-
uation, a large part of Roma avoid deportation—which
in the course of the Europeanization of migration policy
is increasingly coordinated by the Frontières Extérieures
(FRONTEX)—by escaping into “illegality” before deporta-
tion is enforced or by leaving the Western Balkans again
after deportation (see e.g. Deutscher Bundestag, 2015b).
Against this overall backdrop, particularly the classi-
fication of Western Balkan states as safe countries of ori-
gin has been disputed: Paech criticizes the classification
by stating that German legislation has not fulfilled the
requirements for the careful examination of potentially
safe countries of origin imposed by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court. Paech therefore submitted a constitutional
challenge, as he considers the legislation on the classifi-
cation “unconstitutional” (Paech, 2015). Numerous stud-
ies by, for instance, the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF, 2012), arrive at a similarly critical classification
of the Western Balkans that considers the situation of
Roma, when seen in its entirety, to constitute “structural
discrimination” (see also Paech, 2016, p. 14).
Criticism from the perspective of EU law relates to
the latter point. According to European Parliament and
European Council (2011), persecution is also present
when there is “an accumulation of various measures, in-
cluding violations of human rights, which is sufficiently
severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner as
mentioned in point”. In order to claim cumulative in-
fringements as a serious violation of human rights at the
state level, Scherr (2015b, p. 161ff) indicates that a nor-
matively coherent implementation is required. In prac-
tice, however, the imprecise formulation of the article
means that this implementation ends up being disadvan-
tageous to the refugees. He qualifies this open-ended for-
mulation at the European level as not only “legally insuf-
ficient”, but also “politically functional”, as it serves to at-
tenuate political controversy at the state level and redi-
rect “moral responsibility” to the juridical field.
Based on the aforementioned points, it is evident
that the term “refugee” not only functions as a legal
category with which the respective receiving states clas-
sify the migration of people according to determined
criteria, but also shows to what extent the receiving
states politically and legally code the countries of origin
(Nieswand, 2015). Nevertheless, at which point persecu-
tion and suffering becomes relevant to gaining asylum
status remains an issue that is both in need of explana-
tion and highly controversial in practice. As the migra-
tion of Roma usually arises as a mixed migration move-
ment (read: a mixture of social, political, and economic
reasons for migration) (Castañeda, 2014) and as these
complex and interlocking connections are not fully re-
flected in the categories of German asylum and refugee
law, an appropriate political and legal process of distin-
guishing between recognition and rejection of refugee
status does not exactly become any easier. By classifying
the Romani migration and thereby coding them as irreg-
ular migrants, however, German legislation has not only
created legal facts, but also confirmed mainstream pub-
licmedia discourse inwhich Roma are a priori considered
poverty migrants and accused of asylum abuse. Politics,
law, and the media thereby not only contribute to fur-
ther criminalization ofmigration, but reinforce and recre-
ate stereotypes as well. Such attitudes, which Heuser
(2014) frames as “anti-Romani racism”, both stand in the
way of an impartial public media appraisal of the human
rights situation and structure the political and legal pat-
terns of meaning (see also Lee, 2014).
6. Struggle for Recognition of Romani Migrants:
Translation of Human Rights
In regard to the struggle for recognition, particularly
active at the federal level are the Romani initiative
“Alle bleiben” (“Everyone Stays”) and the “Bundes Roma
Verband” (BRV, “Federal Romani Association”) as well
as “Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg” (“United Roma in
Hamburg”), “Initiative Rromnja” (Berlin), “Roma Cen-
ter Göttingen e.V.”, “Roma-Art-Action” (Essen), “Aktion
302/GGUA” (Munster), and “Rom e.V.” (Cologne) at
the regional or communal level. These (partly) well-
networked “grassroots” organizations are (directly or in-
directly) aided by numerous interest groups advocating
13 Between the EU and the Western Balkans, readmission agreements entered into force from 2007 (respectively, in the case of Albania, in 2005). Cf. Mi-
grationsrecht.net (2007).
14 The right to depart requires certain criteria to be met, including monetary reserves, declarations, travel insurance, etc.
15 Current developments in the Western Balkans (except Croatia) again show that their EU accession process is at a standstill. This is due, on the one
hand, in particular, to the unclear perspective of joining the EU and, on the other hand, to flourishing nationalism. Cf. Milačić (2017).
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on their behalf, such as political associations, church as-
sociations, or NGOs. These include not just the “usual
suspects”, for example leftist or refugee organizations,
but also institutions located at the EU- and UN-level.
When I now sketch out the practices of translation
and appropriation, which gain validity within the strug-
gles, I assume, following Gephart (2015), that Romani
migrants and their representatives are intertwining uni-
versal codes of human rights and legal-cultural practices.
In the course of this, they reinterpret the actual jurisdic-
tion, produce new rights, and enforce legal claims in form
of justification narratives. The translation of justification
narratives into the political-legal fields thus comes to the
fore in two disparate ways. On the one hand, this occurs
as strategic essentialism inwhich particular cultural traits
and identifications are essentialized and politicized (Spi-
vak, 1988). On the other hand, certain justification nar-
ratives are expressed as strategic universalism in which
general norms and values, such as democracy, solidar-
ity, and integration, are referenced (Gilroy, 2000). Based
on my empirical analyses, I have identified six justifica-
tion narratives that apply to differing extents depending
on the spatial and temporal context and are intended to
lead to a successful normative linking with current asy-
lum or refugee law, in particular:
a) According to trustworthy estimates, approxi-
mately 500,000 people persecuted as “gypsies”
fell victim to the atrocities in Europe carried
out by the Nazis (Wissenschaftliche Dienste des
Deutschen Bundestages, 2009, p. 10). In the
course of reappraising the genocide and history
of injustice during the Third Reich, appeals have
been made to Germany’s historical responsibility
towards Roma from the Western Balkans, as no
adequate compensation has been made so far.16
By relating their history to that of Jews, Roma latch
on to the universalization process of the Holo-
caust as a relatively new form of normativity and
link transnational memorial structures with legal-
moral claims.17
b) The next justification narrative also relates to
the Holocaust as a universal norm, but in a de-
contextualized manner. In 1999, the Holocaust
served as a legitimization figure for an offensive
NATO war in Kosovo (Wallerstein, 2006). The Eu-
ropean Roma Rights Centre (2001), for example,
spoke of the biggest catastrophe for Roma since
World War II—first directly through the bombard-
ments and then through the subsequent retalia-
tory attacks through Kosovar troops who caused
a mass exodus throughout Europe. Since the Ger-
man government at the time was co-responsible
for both the need to relocate and the destruction
of the cultural livelihood of Roma, the narrative
thus argues that the current German government
bears responsibility here, too.18
c) The following narrative comprises the category “in-
tegration” as a domestic political code. In contrast
to the previous two narratives, this one should not
be interpreted as strategic essentialism, but rather
as strategic universalism, as no differences, but
instead shared democratic values are articulated
here. Various Romani organizations and their sup-
porters point to feats of integration and, rooted in
this context, particularly those for Romani children
born and raised in Germany.19
d) A further justification narrative refers to the legal
order of the EU. Proponents of a right of residence
argue that the Geneva Convention on Refugees
should be interpreted more generously, namely in
the way it is fixated in the Qualification Directive
of the European Parliament and European Council
(2011), which argues that structural discrimination
should also find increasing recognition as a reason
for seeking refuge.20
e) Another narrative is targeted at the classification
of the Western Balkan states as safe countries of
origin. This classification is not regarded as an ob-
jective situational assessment, but rather as a con-
sideration implicitly aimed at preventing the en-
try of Roma that leads to an unreasonable dis-
tinction between legitimate refugees and poverty
migrants.21
f) The last justification narrative draws a connec-
tion beyond the cultural context towards a larger
democratic and whole-societal level. Since the re-
sistance is aimed against the further hollowing-out
of civilizational feats, these struggles serve democ-
racy. Asylum law, according to the argument, is a
suitable field of experimentation for future legal
standards, as bio-political scenarios can be tested
with irregularized migrants or refugees and then
also be extended to other marginalized or precari-
ous groups as needed, such as the unemployed.22
Following this outline of the different justification narra-
tives, I shall conclude by elaborating on the occupation
of the Memorial by “Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg” in
cooperation with the German nationwide initiative “Alle
16 See, for example, author’s interview with a former federal minister, Büdingen (2016); Romani representatives, Cologne (2015).
17 For general information on the topic “Universalization process of the Holocaust”, see Alexander (2012).
18 See, for example, author’s interview with Romani representative, Cologne (2015), field note in the context of a political event, Frankfurt (2016).
19 See, for example, author’s interview with Romani migrants, Cologne (2012), Munster (2012), Berlin (2016); Bonn (2016); former human rights repre-
sentative of the German government, Munster (2016), representative in European Parliament, Bonn-Strasbourg (Phone Interview) (2016).
20 See, for example, author’s interview with Romani representative, Hamburg (2016); field notes in the context of political events with the participation
of Romani representatives and civil society organizations, Cologne (2015), Berlin (2016).
21 See, for example, author’s interview with Romani representative, Hamburg (2016); Romani migrants, Berlin (2016).
22 See, for example, author’s field notes in the context of political events with the participation of Romani representatives and civil society organizations,
Munster (2016) and Frankfurt (2016).
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bleiben”, as this example illustrates both the intertwining
of justification narratives and forms of mobilizing protest
participants. Further, conflict lines between the occu-
pants and other organizations can be shown, which in
essence surround the question of a legitimate translation
of human rights claims as well as the appropriate inter-
pretation and various appropriation of historical symbols
and memory.
7. Forms of Struggles for Recognition: The Case of the
Memorial of the Sinti and Roma in 2016
On May 22, 2016, a group of approximately 50 Roma
from Hamburg and Kiel, led by “Romano Jekipe ano
Hamburg” and “Alle bleiben”, occupied the Memorial
to the Sinti and Roma Victims of National Socialism
in Berlin. The Memorial was opened in 2012 following
several political debates since the late 1980s. The fact
that the massive and systematic murder of those perse-
cuted as gypsies under the Third Reich was recognized
as genocide by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in
1982 can be attributed to an earlier well-organized civil
rights movement by German Sinti and Roma, with the
activist Romani Rose leading the way (Schulze, 2010; van
Baar, 2015).
According to Rose (2012), the Chairman of the “Cen-
tral Council of German Sinti and Roma”, the Memorial’s
political-remembrance relevance exists not only in com-
memorating the genocide, but also in combating con-
temporary and future forms of “antiziganism” and “anti-
semitism”.23 Although Rose considers the current discrim-
ination and persecution both a German and European
challenge, the Central Council, the strongest political rep-
resentative of the German minority, views its task pri-
marily as representing, securing, and claiming the rights
of German Sinti and Roma. The occupants again build
on strategies that can be labeled as the “Europeaniza-
tion of Roma representation” (van Baar, 2015). The “Euro-
peanization of Roma representation”was employedmost
recently in the eastward expansion of the EU, whereby
the EU did not see the Roma’s living situation (here as an
umbrella term) to be in linewith general human rights. As
a result, this was defined as a “European problem” that
needed to be solved via legislative measures and (devel-
opment) projects (van Baar, 2011a). By drawing on the Eu-
ropean representation form and the symbolism that em-
anates from theMemorial and connecting the two aswell
as the German state’s view of its historic responsibility to
do justice to all EuropeanRoma, especially those from the
Western Balkans, they are hoping for an extension of cur-
rent German asylum and refugee protection in the form
of residence rights. How this takes place and which justifi-
cation narratives thereby come into playwill be explained
in the following sections.
No longer feeling solidarity and disappointed by
politicians, the occupants considered the Memorial an
appropriate place to make a political statement against
deportations and raise awareness for the human rights
situation, according to a Romani representative from
the initiative “Alle bleiben” and the “Bundes Roma Ver-
band”.24 The classification of theWestern Balkans as safe
countries of origin, in particular, is viewed as a conse-
quentialmisinterpretation and an abolishment of asylum
law. As the Romani representative of “Romano Jekipe
ano Hamburg” formulated: “These states may be safe,
but not for Roma”. Against this background, the repre-
sentative demanded a halt to deportations and a right
of residence on humanitarian grounds. In this context,
he also pointed to Germany’s historical responsibility,
adding that he could not comprehend the hierarchiza-
tion of victims by the German government. He thereby
criticized the preference given to the fate of Jews and
called for “compensation”, which neither his grandpar-
ents nor he had received. The case of Jewish contingent
refugeeswho obtained a humanitarian right of residence
in the early 1990s shows that such a justification narra-
tive can lead to a right of residence.25
With these arguments, the protest participants from
Hamburg and Kiel could also bemobilized. Since they are
subject to compulsory residence, not only their travel
to Berlin, but also the unannounced occupation placed
their already fragile status in jeopardy. According to a
Romani migrant who participated in the occupation, the
initiators’ justification was convincing even though the
actions constituted criminal offenses according to Ger-
man law. The significance of the Memorial, which they
had previously not rated so highly, aroused hope in them
that they could, in fact, still receive right of residence
during the occupation.26 Further, the organizations en-
joyed the trust of the protest participants, a Romani
representative of “Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg” main-
tained, as they had gained knowledge about resistance
over many years of political activity. This knowledge was
acquired through networking with other Romani and
refugee organizations.27
While the occupation, according to a Romani rep-
resentative of “Alle bleiben”, garnered great media at-
tention, it did not lead to the desired success, as riot
police vacated the premises after an unresolved con-
flict between the occupants and the property owners,
the “Foundation Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Eu-
rope”.28 The eviction did occur, however, in consultation
23 The significance of the location of the Memorial is thus strengthened as it is directly beside the Reichstag and close to Brandenburg Gate and the
Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. For more on the political-remembrance significance of the Memorial, see van Baar (2015).
24 Author’s interview with Romani representative of “Alle bleiben” and the “Bundes Roma Verband”, Berlin (2016); see also field notes in the context of
political event, Frankfurt (2016).
25 Author’s interview with Romani representative of “Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg”, Hamburg (2016).
26 Author’s interview with Romani migrant, Berlin (2016).
27 Author’s interview with Romani representative of Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg, Hamburg (2016).
28 Author’s interview with Romani representative of “Alle bleiben” and the “Bundes Roma Verband”, Berlin (2016).
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 77–88 83
with the “Central Council of German Sinti and Roma”,
“Roma Trial”, and high ranking politicians of the Green
Party and the President of the German Parliament—who
demonstrated solidarity with the protesters, but never-
theless legitimated the eviction with the argument that
the dignity of the place had been compromised by the
protest action (Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Ju-
den Europas, 2016).29
Whereas the occupiers interpreted the Memorial as
the one place where their demands could still be heard
due to its sacral symbolism, the property owners and
their supporters had a different stance. While they, too,
viewed the Memorial as a sacred place, they consid-
ered political protests there tantamount to sacrilege, as
the murdered had found their final resting place there
(Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas,
2016).30 “Alle bleiben” (2016) countered that the evic-
tion by a police unit itself should be considered a prac-
tice that was both political and based on violence. They
accused the foundation of reserving the right for polit-
ical actions on their own premises, while denying this
right to protesters. They further reproached the property
owners and their supporters of a failing, formulated in
a commentary as follows: “What happened last night in
Berlin is a demonstration of the inability of the power-
ful to face the suffering of Roma moved to and fro for
decades” (own translation). Next to the social problem
of constant human rights violations committed against
Roma, a conflict concerning the legitimate interpretation
of the past and its symbols can be detected here as well.
In this regard, “Alle bleiben” raises the question: “Where
does remembrance end and where does politics begin
—and who decides?”
Shortly following the occupation, the foundation con-
vened at a round table in the “Sicherheitstrakt” (roughly:
“security wing”) of the “Memorial to the Murdered Jews
of Europe” (Berlin) in order to find a solution to the
residence law situation of the Romani migrants. While
several established politicians participated at the round
table—including members from Green and Left Parties
as well as a subordinate of the Minister of State and
a former Federal Minister on the governmental side
—“Romano Jekipe ano Hamburg” or “Alle bleiben” were
not invited. The only Romani representative was from
“Roma Trail”, who sided with the property owners during
the occupation. While the round table was not a govern-
mental institution and the participants therefore had no
direct influence on the residence law situation of Roma,
their professions meant that the participants were well
networked and influential.31
However, the participants of the round table came
to the assessment that the demands to revoke the clas-
sification of the Western Balkan states as safe countries
of origin, establish a quota solution, and secure an unre-
stricted right of residence did not represent realistic op-
tions that could be plead for to the German federal gov-
ernment. Rather, considering the political developments
in Germany (see, for instance, the “refugee crisis” and
the electoral victories of the right-wing party “AfD”), a
pragmatic solution should be targeted. Given the tense
public media discourse surrounding refugees, however,
one could not carry out the demands for right of resi-
dence in public, but rather behind the scenes in the form
of lobbying efforts or legal practice.32
The analysis of the occupation could show that while
the actors involved have the same goal, namely right of
residence for Romani migrants, they prefer other strate-
gies for the ensuring of human rights.Whereas the round
table did not give consideration to the demand for a col-
lective right of residence but “merely” advocated lob-
bying and stronger efforts in individual cases,33 “Alle
bleiben” and the “Bundes Roma Verband” insist on a hu-
manitarian right of residence and are attempting to suc-
ceed in this goal through a petition and further politi-
cal activities.34 In addition, it was also shown that the
Memorial’s symbolism is interpreted against the back-
ground of cultural application filters, whereby the thus
involved conflict presents a struggle for the legitimate
representation of political resistance in the face of the
German migration regime.
8. Conclusion
Factually seen, the human rights claims for a collective
right of residence for Romani migrants is misconceived
and distorted by the German federal government. A
quote from the former Minister of the Interior, Wolf-
gang Schäuble (2007), clearly illustrates this situation,
notwithstanding the fact that it already dates back a
decade: “But first it is not possible to treat Roma and
Sinti differently than other foreigners with the same sta-
tus in this manner, for that would amount to positive
discrimination” (own translation). In other words: Once
Romani migrants apply for asylum or receive a Duldung
(temporary suspension of deportation), thereby apply-
ing for a state decision, the remainder of the process is
then also legally carried out according to this logic. The
moral responsibility that follows the question of affilia-
tion of Romani migrants is consequentially rejected by
German policy and is redirected to asylum and refugee
law, in the course of which the majority of protection
claims are denied.
At the same time, the German government is at-
tempting to steer the migration of Roma from the West-
ern Balkans by embedding this in their political economy.
Given the increasing number of asylum seekers from
29 See also author’s interview with civil society organization representative, Berlin (2016).
30 See also author’s interview with civil society organization representative, Berlin (2016).
31 Author’s interview with civil society organization representative, Berlin (2016).
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Field notes in the context of political event, Berlin (2016).
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the Western Balkans in the year 2015, the federal gov-
ernment slightly opened the migration corridor in accor-
dance with legal measures. However, especially trainees,
highly-qualified persons as well as professionals, whose
longer stays were made possible through strongly reg-
ulated work visas, benefit from this. Within these mea-
sures, an incentive for asylum seekers to voluntarily leave
Germany and demand a work visa in their countries of
origin, which would enable a stable residence, should si-
multaneously be created. Aside from the fact that many
work visa applications fail due to bureaucratic hurdles
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2017), the economization of im-
migration law diametrically opposes the protest move-
ment’s demands for human rights.
In the overall context, the negative decisions and de-
portations are in turn culturalized by the protest move-
ment and are recalled as a further episode in the history
of rights infringements or even as an “anti-Roma” legal
state. In the course of this, human rights, however, are
no neutral topos. On the contrary, the Romani protest
movement has appropriated the power of human rights
to the extent that it strategically makes use of the ob-
jection in order to exert normative pressure on state in-
stitutions. Romani and refugee organizations, in partic-
ular, repeatedly demonstrate new and creative ways to
problematize practices of the German migration regime
and produce new human rights semantics. They make
their efforts visible in form of counter de-politicization
of irregularizedmigrants, and, last but not least, justifica-
tion narratives. Within these narratives, strategic essen-
tialism and universalism are not to be understood as an-
tagonisms, but rather as necessary forms of representa-
tion that interact with each other in order for Roma to
become visible as a collective. In the “name of culture”
(Gephart, 2012, p. 43), together with its inherent univer-
sal human rights norms, they thus convey belonging to
the German nation-state. Nevertheless, the occupation
of the Memorial has demonstrated that differing trans-
lation and appropriation throughout the legal struggles
can lead to (inner) conflicts, which in this case resulted
in a further differentiation of the protest movement.
By analyzing additional cases, the connection among
Romani “grassroots” organizations and non-Romani or-
ganizations could be shown in more detail as could the
concrete knowledge translated between them and the
forms associated with reciprocal politicization. From a
more comparative perspective, there are still questions
concerning Romani migrants’ relationship to Romani or-
ganizations, on the one hand, as well as to non-Romani
organizations, on the other. This approach could also
shed light on how different modi operandi of the appro-
priation and translation of human rights within the strug-
gle for recognition become visible.
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